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AMERCANS are puzzled these days to hear from all sides that their foreign
policy is not always popular abroad. Some resent this. Others, more prudent,
seek the cause.
This political situation has its legal aspect, among which perhaps the
most noteworthy is the adverse reaction abroad to the application of our
antitrust laws to foreign corporations. On the one side, we have a series
of actions by the Department of justice, commanding apparently universal
acquiescence in principle on the part of the American bar and endorsed in
principle by uniformly favorable decisions of American judges.' It has been
assumed without question that the United States has jurisdiction over agree-
ments governing trade and commerce in all countries of the world, whether
in raw materials or finished products, whether in aluminum, petroleum,
chemicals, or electrical products. Whether the agreement relates to trade
in England, Egypt, or Ecuador, we have taken jurisdiction when some "effect"
has been felt in the United States.
tMember, New York Bar; barrister-at-law, Inner Temple, London.
1. Notably, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 143 F2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945);
United States v. General Electric Co., 32 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949) ; United States v.
Imperial Chemical Industries, 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), final decree entered,
105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The acquiescence by the bar is exemplified in the under-
lined portion of the following from judge Learned Hand's opinion in the Aluminum case:
"On the other hand, it is settled law-as Limited itself agrees-than any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders
which the state reprehends." 143 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (emphasis added). A
notable feature of Judge Hand's statement is that it purports tv be a statement of the law
of nations. But no international authorities were tendered by Judge Hand to support his
decision on international law. Only United States authorities were cited: "Strassheim v.
Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284,285 .... ; Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65, 66,...; Ford
v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620, 621,...; Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 65." The
bribery in Strassheilm and the false pretenses in Lamnr were directed tuward lucal jurisdic-
tion, and did not concern foreign nations at all. The Ford case involved a conspiracy, to
which Americans in San Francisco, as well as the British defendants aboard ship, were
parties, to violate the prohibition laws by running intoxicating liquor into San Francisco
Bay. By treaty, Great Britain surrendered its right to object to the exercise of jurisdiction
in cases of that character. The foreign nation concerned had thus expressly waived any
question of international law.
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On the other side, but until now ignored in our courts, those antitrust
activities have run up against the pride of foreign nations in their independent
sovereignty, and against the principle of territoriality in international law.
The classic authorities in international law are as absolute in their rejection
of the sort of jurisdiction recently asserted by our prosecutors and courts as
are the latter in its assertion. Here is a dangerous conflict that calls for
reconciliation. 2
We are concerned with jurisdiction; accordingly, the first requisite is to
distinguish between jurisdiction over the person and jurisdiction over the
subject-matter. A principal source of trouble has lain in the tendency to
assume that if the former exists, the latter must follow. It has not always
been realized that a court may have jurisdiction over the person of a defend-
ant, but that it lacks jurisdiction over a particular act of that defendant. In
international law the guiding rule is that a State A may assert personal
jurisdiction over its own nationals for all purposes but over foreign nationals
only for their acts within its territorial jurisdiction. State A, in asserting
jurisdiction over its own nationals for their acts within the territory of State
B, must, however, refrain from ordering them to act within that territory in
violation of the laws there prevailing. And if State A seeks to extend its
jurisdiction over an act in State B to a national of State B, this will normally
be a breach both of the law and of the comity of nations. It is in effect a form
of aggression-judicial aggression.
This was certainly the view of the Supreme Court in American Banana
Company v. United Fruit Company.8 Coming to the Court on demurrer, the
issue was whether or not to refuse jurisdiction over an alleged act of violence
in Costa Rica by one American company against another. The decision was
against jurisdiction. It has often been explained away on the ground that the
defendant had procured the intervention of a file of soldiers, who committed
the physical act, and that the case therefore stands only for the proposition
that United States courts will not review the sovereign act of a foreign govern-
ment. The Court, however, gave alternative grounds for its decision, of which
only the second was the sovereign act of the Costa Rican government. The
first ground was that the acts (whatever they were) took place outside the
2. That our concern is not academic has been demonstrated by the fate of that part
of a decree entered by Judge Ryan in the important antitrust case of United States v.
Imperial Chemical Industries, 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Judge Ryan exercised
jurisdiction to order transfer in England, by a British Company (ICI) to an American
corporation (duPont), of title to British patents. ICI had fpreviously granted an ex-
clusive license to another British Company (British Nylon Spinners Co., Ltd.) of which
one-half of the shares was owned by IGI and one-half by a third British company
(Courtaulds) not a party to the litigation. Within a fortnight of Judge Ryan's order,
performance of this order was enjoined by a British court (Judgment by Upjohn, J., in
the Vacation Court, August 13, 1952), and the decision of Upjohn, 3. was upheld by the
court of appeal, British Nylon Spinners v. ICI, [1953] 1 Ch. 19.
3. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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United States, and that there was no jurisdiction if the Sherman Act was to
be construed in harmony with international law.4
The authority of the Banana case has been repeatedly recognized by the
Supreme Court., And where the Court has considered that the particular
circumstances called for an application of extra-territorial jurisdiction, it has
been careful to recognize that the Banana case was nonethele.ss authority
both for the general rule and for the Sherman Act rule. The particular de-
cisions were treated as special exceptions because of the compelling language
of the particular statute under construction.0
4. See the following famous pasage in Justice Holmes' opinion, id. at 355-7: "In the
first place the acts causing the damage were done, so far as appears, outside the jurisdiction
of the United States, and within that of other states. It is surprising to hear it argued
that they were governed by the act of Congress.
"[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful
or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country %,.here the act is
done.... For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat
him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did the acts,
not only would be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of another
sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly
might resent. ...
"... The foregoing considerations would lead in case of doubt, to a construction of
any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits
over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power. 'All legislation is prima
facie territorial.' [Citing cases]. Words having universal scope, such as 'every contract
in restraint of trade,' 'every person who shall monopolize: etc., will be taken as a matter
of course to mean only every one subject to such legislation, not all that the legislator
subsequently may be able to catch. In the case of the present statute [the Sherman Act]
the improbability of the United States attempting to make acts done in Panama or Costa
Rica criminal is obvious, yet the law begins by making criminal the acts for which it
gives a right to sue....
"For again, not only were the acts of the defendant in Panama or Costa Rica not with-
in the Sherman Act, but they were not torts by the law of the place and therefore were
not torts at all, however contrary to the ethlcal and economic postulates of that statute."
5. Foley Brothers v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 287 (1949); Jackson v. S.S. Archimedes,
275 U.S. 463, 467 (1928); New York Central v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 32 (1925);
Sandberg v. MacDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195 (1918); Cuba Railroad Co. v. Crosby, 22
U.S. 473, 478 (1912).
A group of cases involving shipping between two nations, tf which the United States
was one, are obviously not in conflict with the Banana case, for these were cases for
concurrent jurisdiction as far as the courts of the two nations were concerned, and for
settlement by treaty if the courts should disagree. United States v. Nord Deutscher Lloyd,
223 U.S. 512 (1912) (transportation between the United States and Germany, with par-
ticular reference to the American end); United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Navi-
gation Co.. 228 U.S. 87 (1913) (transportation between tie United Stateb and Alaska
or Canada); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917) (transportation between the United
States and South Africa). Nor can United States v. Sisal Sales Curp., 274 U.S. 26s
(1927), be regarded as having overruled the Banana case, for the conspiracy in Sisal was
entered into, and in large part to be performed within, the United States.
6. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (bribery of a public officer; an
interstate, not an international, case); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97 (1922j
(a criminal statute relating to conspiracy by citizens to defraud the United States);
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The principle that American statutes are not to be construed to apply to
acts abroad because Congress must be presumed to have intended not to
violate international law, was not invented by Mr. Justice Holmes and his
brethren in the Banana case. It goes back to the earliest volumes of the Su-
preme Court reports, in the opinions of such Justices as Marshall and Story.
Before accepting the proposition that American law, laid down from the time
of Chief Justice Marshall to the time of Justice Holmes, has been changed, the
Banana opinon should be examined.8
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932) (refusal by a citizen of the United
States to return to the United States to testify) ; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (Joint Resolution expressly directed to prevent United
States citizens selling munitions of war in the United States for use in the Chaco war) ;
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941) (United States citizen taking commerelal
sponges from the ocean off the the coast of Florida.)
7. "An Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the Law of Nations,
if any other possible construction remains," said Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner
Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (U.S. 1804). And in The Appollon, 9 Wheat. 361, 367
(U.S. 1824), Mr. Justice Story said: "The laws of no nation can justly extend beyond
its own territories, except so far as regards its own citizens. They can have no force
to control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation, within its own jurisdiction. And
however general and comprehensive the phrases used in our municipal laws may be, they
must always be restricted in construction, to places and persons, upon whom the legislature
have authority and jurisdiction."
8. So far as can be determined, an argument based on international law has not been
adequately brought forward in any of the pertinent antitrust cases in the past fifteen
years. To reserve this question may well have been the express purpose of the Supreme
Court in its relevant dictum in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289 (1952):
"Where, as here, there can be no interference with the sovereignty of
another nation, the District Court in exercising its equity powers may
command persons properly before it to cease or perform acts outside its
territorial jurisdiction."
The Court then admonished us, id. at 289, n.17, to "see British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v.
Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1952], 2 All Eng. 780, 782 (C.A.)." These words
at least reserve the question with which international law is concerned, vi.., if there is
interference with the sovereignty of another nation, what will be the Court's position?
In Bulova both parties were citizens of the United States. The defendant assembled
watch parts and stamped the name "Bulova" upon them, distributing most of them in
Mexico and some in the United States. In applying the Lanham Act, on the ground
that it reached "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress," the Court
took occasion to say that the Banana case "compels nothing to the contrary." Id. at 288.
After distinguishing the Banana decision on the ground that action had been taken by
the Costa Rican government, the Court said:
"Viewed in its context, the holding in that case was not meant to confer
blanket immunity on trade practices which radiate unlawful consequences
here, merely because they were initiated or consummated outside tile territorial
limits of the United States. Unlawful effects in this country, absent in the
posture of the Banana case before us, are often decisive. . . ." Ibid.
As in only too many cases before the Court, the point was barely argued. Outside of a
few citations in the respondent's brief, the Court, to the extent that it wished to
explore international law, had to do so through its own resources. We are entitled to
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In ascertaining whether or not justice Holmes misconstrued tile Sherman
Act, our inquiry may be confined to Section 1 of the Act. This is a reasonable
choice because the overwhelming majority of the important cases under the
antitrust laws have been those which arose under that Section. And it is
that Section which has been principally considered in the important inter-
national cases. Section 1 contains three brief concepts, declaring "illegal"
(1) "every contract, combination .. .or conspiracy" (2) "in restraint of"
(3) "trade or commerce with foreign nations." By embracing every "con-
tract, combination .. .or conspiracy," Section 1 was designed to refer, and
has been authoritatively construed to refer, to every possible agreement, or,
indeed, "understanding" among business men, whether written or oral. Agree-
ments may be indicated merely by a nod of the head or by a knowing smile.
or, as decided in the famous U.S. Steel case, by silence when business men
would understand that silence gives consent
The second concept---"in restraint of"-is equally wide. The Supreme
Court has pointed out that every event in trade necessarily "restrains," for
if A and C are each trying to make a trade with B, and .4 succeeds, B is re-
strained. Consequently, the Court adopted what is called "the rule of reason";
that is to say, the word "restrain" in the statute must necessarily be construed
as being confined only to those acts which "unduly and unreasonably restrain."
But the action of these adverbs only emphasis the width of the verb. It
follows necessarily that the statute must be applied according to the notions
of the judges who apply it and that these notions in turn must conform es-
sentially to the commercial standards of the community in which the judges
live. In other words, it simply means that American standards will be
applied.
The Sherman Act has been called our charter of freedom for all trade.',
A more correctly descriptive phrase than "antitrust laws" might well be
nothing less than "laws governing trade and commerce." True. major sectors
of trade and commerce-e.g., railroads, shipping, aviation, public utilities,
and agriculture-have been in large part excepted by the Congress from the
antitrust laws. The Sherman Act can only apply to residual problems in these
"industries," their central problems being regulated by other governmental
means. Other sectors of activity--e.g., labor relations-are economic in
presume that on a question of international importance they would not consider that
they had foreclosed their judgment against full argument merely because they had given
expression to a dictum in Bidora.
The Ba waa case was also referred to in the dissenting opinion of Justices Reed and
Douglas, but there was nothing in this dissent that indicated a difference of opinion with
the majority. Id. at 290-1. Moreover the dissent said: "The Lanham Act, like the Sherman
Act, should be construed to apply only to acts done within the sovereignty of the United
States." Id. at 292. This again indicates that the Sherman Act was limited, and that the
question considered and decided by the Court in the Bidora case was whether or not the
Lanham Act should be similarly "confined."
9. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 223 Fed. 55, 159-60 (D.N.J. 1915).
10. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 2' 8 U.S. 344, 359 (1933).
1954]
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character but not covered by the Sherman Act, because they do not fall
within the word "industry." Even many purely "industrial" activities are ex-
cepted from the principles of the antitrust laws; for example, the production
of oil is regulated by restrictive principles imposed by the states of the Union
and supported by a federal compact and statute.
These extensive exceptions governing most of the really basic industrial
activities-of the type that in many foreign nations are simply nationalized-
might well give us pause as to whether the enthusiasm of public opinion and
of the courts for rigorous enforcement of the principles of Adam Smith
in all other branches of commerce should not be more tempered. It can hardly
be ultimate economic truth that the division is so sharp between those in-
dustrial activities in which competitive forces should be closely restricted by
the State and those in which competition is required to be of a cut-throat char-
acter. We cannot be so surprised, therefore, when we find that foreign nations
beg leave to differ with us as to the wisdom of application of the antitrust
laws, in all their ferocity, to some of these industries which may happen to be
more basic in economics than our Congress or States have yet got around to
recognizing.
The third concept in Section 1--"trade or commerce with foreign nations"
-is a jurisdictional feature of the statute. The Federal Government had
authority to enact, and the courts have authority to enforce, the Sherman
Act only because it is within the constitutional delegation of authority "to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes."'" There is a difference in principle between the
relation of the Federal Government to interstate commerce and its relation
to foreign commerce. The Court has recognized the peculiar and preemptive
power of the Executive in foreign affairs.' 2 Underlying this recognition is
the fact that foreign affairs involve a whole mass of potential conflicts which
are normally settled by diplomacy and ultimately by war, and which are neces-
sarily quite different from the conflicts among the several states of the Union.
By parity of reasoning the jurisdictional reach of a legislative enactment
applicable to "Commerce with foreign Nations" should be solicitously con-
trolled.
The United States is not compelled by rules of statutory interpretation
to assert jurisdiction over acts abroad which have merely "some effects" in
this country merely because it asserts jurisdiction over domestic acts which
have effects on interstate commerce. The Constitution distinguishes between
commerce "with" foreign nations and commerce "among" the several states,
and the same distinction is carried into the Sherman Act. A fair construc-
tion of the English language might reasonably support a holding that there is
a wider compulsion in the power to regulate what occurs "among" domestic
sovereignties than there is to regulate what occurs "with" foreign nations.
11. U.S. CosesT. Art. I, § 8.
12. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
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There are weighty considerations of historical and juridical importance in
the field of foreign affairs that far outweigh the simple process of drawing
analogies from experience in domestic affairs. During an earlier period in
our national histry, we were as concerned as we are today about our relations
with foreign nations. The first generation of the Republic coincided with the
period of the Napoleonic wars and their aftermath. Throughout this period
the United States was predominantly a commercial navigating nation. The
period of the clipper ships carried at least through the second generation an
emphasis upon relations with Europe, both in trade and in culture, whether
on the part of the navigating States of the North or the cotton exporting States
of the South. It was in this atmosphere that Justices Marshall and Story lived
and wrote. And the decisions in our highest Court were free of parochialism
in this formative period.
After a century of looking predominantly westward, and of turning its back
on the foreign world, the United States entered the current period of inter-
nationalism. But we wear our internationalism with a difference. The political
events which evidenced our awakening to the threat from Hitler's Germany
had immediate consequences in the antitrust field. Concomitant to the Neu-
trality Act of 1940 ("cash and carry") and the Lend Lease Act of 1941 ("all
aid to the Allies short of war"), the Government commenced a series of well
publicized prosecutions and injunction proceedings aganist German companies.
These companies were not then, and of course have never since been, in a
position really to defend themselves before our courts on terms of equality with
the Department of justice. Nor was it long before actions were commenced
also against companies in allied and neutral countries. After all. there was
no distinction in principle, and the anti-cartel crusade was in full swing.
For some years into the post-war period all European companies were in
a poor position to defend themselves. The United States was the nation tu
whom all European nations were looking for sal-ation, first by way of defense
in a desperate struggle on their doorsteps and later for aid when their econo-
mies were disrupted. European governments were in no mood to provide any
of their sparse dollar exchange to companies which wished to take legal action
of a character which, to timid government officials, appeared to be a contest
with the all-powerful Government across the Atlantic. The decade of the
1940's measures the period during which European nations were essentially
prostrate. Yet it was precisely during the '40s that antitrust enforcement,
alike in war and peace, advanced by leaps and bounds, culminating with the
decree of Judge Ryan in the Imperial Chemical Industries case in 1952, which
in turn gave rise to the sharp reaction of the English courts in the British
Nylon Spiners case. The new idea of leadership in international affairs and
the ease of its assertion against the comparative weakness of foreign nations,
the sense of power here and of acquiescence there, subcunsciously led us into
neglect of the heretofore well-established limitations on sovereignty.
This neglect is evidenced in the assumption of some American law)yerb that
since federal jurisdiction grows in an expanding field of interstate commerce,
19541
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the same must be true of the utterly different and more sensitive area of inter-
national commerce. Contributing to this assumption is the terminology of the
American legal profession which refers to events in another state in the same
terms as to events abroad; both are said to be "foreign." The corporation at
one end of the Hudson Tube is a "foreign corporation" at the other end, and
is there governed by "foreign law." How natural, therefore, that American
lawyers should have assumed, when suddenly confronted with international
conceptions of wide-reaching public import, that they are familiar, from their
limited domestic experience, with the authorities necessary to decide them.
Other factors have contributed to our present attitude. The growth of
federal power over the states tended to blur the judicial consciousness of
territorial boundaries. There was indeed a policy on the part of recent Ad-
ministrations to appoint judges who would be less inhibited in crossing those
boundaries. In seeking qualified appointees for the federal bench, no emphasis
was laid on international experience. While a judge can be a fine, honest
judge on domestic issues, no doubt, without ever having traveled or studied
abroad, it is not surprising that he sometimes falls into error where interna-
tional comity is concerned.
But the problem is not only, or indeed essentially, a legal one. It is a
national problem-the relation of this nation with other nations. In consider-
ing whether the United States should cease attempting to impose its antitrust
laws upon other peoples, President Eisenhower's Inaugural Address sounds
the keynote:
"Honoring the identity and heritage of each nation of the world,
we shall never use our strength to try to impress upon another
people our own cherished political and economic institutions."
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